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THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE: THE
HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
SUPPORTING A PRIVILEGE FOR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY
Judicial privilege is an obscure doctrine of evidentiary law that promotes
the confidentiality of judicial communications.' Courts have invoked the
privilege to protect the communications between judges and their law clerks
and to protect the substance of judicial deliberations. 2 Commentators have
suggested that the privilege is unnecessary and unjustifiable within a democratic government.' The courts have acknowledged the legitimacy of judicial
privilege, relying on tradition and the doctrine of separation of powers as

1. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring
and dissenting). Although the judiciary claims a privilege protecting the confidentiality of
judicial communications, little express authority exists that recognizes the existence of the
privilege. Id. Despite the lack of express authority sustaining the privilege, both tradition and
the doctrine of separation of powers support the legitimacy of judicial privilege. Id.
The common law principle of privilege creates an exception to the rule that every person
has a duty to provide testimony that contributes to the development of all relevant facts at
trial. 5 WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TmAMs AT
COMiON LAW § 2285 (2d. ed. 1923); see United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)(public
interest in maintaining integrity of adversarial system demands that every person provide
relevant evidence at trial, except persons who can invoke protection of constitutional, common
law or statutory privilege).

Although the rules of privilege exclude from consideration competent legal evidence
that could assist the fact finder's determination in a particular case, the rationale for the rules
of privilege is the protection of significant interests and relationships that society considers to
be justification for the exclusion of the evidence in open court. McConUCK ON EVIDENCE §
130 (E. Cleary ed. 1984); see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)(privileges are justifiable only to extent that permitting exclusion of relevant
evidence promotes public interest that transcends interest of promoting fact finder's objective).
The executive branch of the federal government enjoys a privilege for information regarding
state and military secrets. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1973). The interest in
preserving national security justifies the exclusion of evidence that would jeopardize that
interest. Id.
2. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1973) (president's expectation of
confidentiality of his communications is similar to claim of confidentiality protecting judicial
deliberations); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971)(per
curiam)(Burger, C.J., dissenting)(Supreme Court has inherent authority to protect confidentiality of deliberations and documents, despite lack of statutory provision conferring authority);
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(president's privilege safeguarding effectiveness of executive decision-making process is similar to privilege for communications among
judges and between judges and their law clerks).
3. See Miller & Sastri, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On the Need for Piercing the
Red Velour Curtain, 22 BuFFALo L. REV. 799, 806, 822 (1973) (secrecy of Supreme Court
decision-making process is inconsistent with need for full disclosure in democratic government);
Grossman, Comments on "Secrecy and the Supreme Court," 22 BuFFALo L. REV. 831, 835
(1973)(full disclosure of judicial decision-making process is more in harmony with democratic
principles).
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authority for the privilege. 4 The courts, however, have not explained adequately the purpose or the scope of the privilege and have not demonstrated
that express authority underlies the doctrine. 5 Despite the lack of express
authority, both historical and constitutional foundations exist that strongly
6
support the doctrine of judicial privilege.
The accounts of delegates who participated in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 reveal that the doctrine of judicial privilege finds legitimacy
in the delegates' struggle to define the judiciary's role within the new system
of government. 7 The delegates recognized the need for a balanced govern-

4. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(MacKinnon, J., concurring
and dissenting)(historical precedent and constitutional separation of powers among branches of
government supports doctrine of judicial privilege); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1971)(Wilkey, J., concurring)(privilege for judicial communications is similar to executive and
legislative privileges and finds support in Constitution and common law).
5. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971)(Burger,
C.J., dissenting)(Supreme Court has inherent power to protect confidentiality of Court communications, but no express authority confers power upon Supreme Court); Nixon v. Sirica
487 F.2d 700, 740 (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting)(doctrine of judicial privilege receives
universal acceptance but has little express support).
6. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080-81 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(Wilkey, J., concurring).
The historical basis for judicial privilege arises from the need to preserve the confidentiality
of the judicial decision-making process. Id.
The constitutional basis for judicial privilege stems from the doctrine of the separation
of powers and the need to preserve the independent functioning of the judicial branch. See
Sharp, The ClassicalAmerican Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. Cm. L. Ray.
385-436 (1935) (explaining historical development of separation of powers and Framers'
implementation of doctrine in federal government); infra note 7 and accompanying text
(discussing Framers' conception of federal judiciary as being independent from executive and
legislative branches); infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (discussing judicial privilege as
means to preserve independence of federal judiciary from legislative or executive interference).
7. See Kaufman, The Essence of JudicialIndependence, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 671, 671
(1980). The delegates who attended the Constitutional Convention contemplated the creation
of a system of government that was revolutionary. Id. The delegates contemplated the formation
of a government system in which co-equal branches shared the powers of government. Id. By
dividing the powers of government among distinct branches, the delegates intended to forestall
any one branch from usurping the powers of government and nullifying the civil and political
rights that the Constitution protected. Id.
The delegates envisioned the federal judiciary as a safeguard of the framework of
government that the Constitution embodies. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUrION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1576 (4th ed. 1873). The delegates foresaw the possibility that in a
government in which the branches exercised limited powers, the branches of government might
transgress the limits of their powers. Id. The delegates, therefore, entrusted to the judiciary
the duty to check the transgressions of the executive and legislative powers and preserve the
separation of powers that the Constitution requires. Id. In light of the judiciary's constitutional
duty to maintain the balance of powers among the branches of the federal government, the
delegates recognized the need to protect the judiciary from the other branches of government.
Id. at § 1574. The delegates anticipated potential conflicts between the judiciary and the other
branches of government, particularly in instances in which the judiciary and the legislature or
the executive would disagree over the judiciary's interpretation of the Constitution. Id. To
protect the judiciary from legislative or executive interference or reprisal that would threaten
the effective functioning of the judicial branch, the delegates instituted constitutional provisions
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ment that could unite the burgeoning nation economically and politically.8
The Framers had learned, however, that a balanced government could not
exist with a weak judiciary that could not act freely and without an
apprehension of the political consequences of its acts.9 The Framers had

that would regulate removal of judges from the judiciary. Id. at §§ 1600, 1601; see infra notes
20-23 and accompanying text (discussing Framers' provision creating life tenure for federal
judges and delegating to Congress power to remove federal judges only through impeachment
proceedings).
Although the delegates did not provide in the Constitution an express provision for a
judicial privilege, the privilege is legitimate because the privilege protects the judiciary from
legislative or executive inquiry that would threaten judicial independence. See infra note 40
and accompanying text (judicial privilege is consistent with purpose of preserving doctrine of
separation of powers).
8. C. BEARD, AN EcoNOmc

INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED

STATEs 52 (rev. ed. 1965). After the states became independent from Great Britain, the states,
through ratification of the Articles of Confederation, formed a central government with limited
powers. Id. The central government lacked an executive department and a federal judiciary.
Id. The Congress, which consisted of only one House, could not levy direct taxes upon the
states and could not regulate state commerce. Id. Under the Articles of Confederation, each
state retained its sovereignty. Id.
In the absence of provisions for federal regulation of state commerce, each state
enforced measures designed to protect the state's market against competition from other states.
J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITTIONAL

LAW

§

4.4 (2d ed. 1983). Each state,

for example, imposed tariffs on competing goods from other states. Id. Moreover, states levied
tariffs on out of state goods that crossed state lines. Id. Consequently, the discriminatory
practices impeded the flow of interstate commerce. Id.
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the lack of federal control over the commercial
activity of the states was a serious concern of the delegates. C. BEARD, supra, at 175. The
delegates perceived that the inhibition of interstate commerce had impeded national economic
development. J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra at § 4.4. Furthermore, the delegates
speculated that without provisions for federal regulation of international trade, each state, in
pursuit of procuring favorable trade relations and strengthening economic alliances with other
nations, would ignore all considerations of national comity. C. BEARD, supra at 186-87.
Without federal control over international commerce, the delegates envisioned entanglements
with foreign nations that would weaken the nation's ability to present a united front against
nations that threatened the security of the United States. Id.
9. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 671. The perceived weaknesses in the development of the
English judiciary strengthened the delegates' conviction of the need to ensure an independent
judiciary. Id. From the inception of the court system in England, the King had exercised
considerable control over the common law courts. I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 194 (1931). The Crown claimed an absolute prerogative when the Crown sought to
circumvent a burdensome common law rule or a statute. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, id. at 445 (1936).
Citizens could not challenge the King's acts. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 671. Judges, who held
commissions durante bene placito, or at the pleasure of the King, were dependent upon the
Crown for salaries and seldom challenged the King's rules. 2 H. BRACTON, ON aM LAWS AND
CusTosis OF ENGLAND 34 (S. Thorne trans. 1968). The Crown's domination of the judiciary
led ultimately to the dissolution of judicial authority in England by the end of the 17th
century. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 671.
To secure the independence of the judiciary in England, Parliament passed the Act of
Settlement (Act) in 1701. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAWv 234 (1927). The
Act provided that judges hold commissions quamdiu se bene gesserint, or during good behavior,
and that judges receive fixed salaries. Id. Moreover, the Act established that only an act of
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seen from Trevett v. Weeden,' 0 for example, that members of the Rhode

Island judiciary were unable to protect a defendant's right to trial by jury
without interference from the Rhode Island Assembly." In Trevett the

defendant, Weeden, was charged with the criminal offense of refusing to
accept Rhode Island paper currency as payment for a debt. 12 Although the

Rhode Island Constitution required a jury trial for all persons charged with
commission of a criminal act, the Rhode Island General Assembly had
provided legislation permitting judges to try summarily without a jury
persons accused of refusing to accept Rhode Island currency.13 At his trial
Weeden alleged that the statute abrogating the right to jury trial violated

the Rhode Island Constitution. 4 The judges hearing the case sustained
Weeden's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. 5
After learning that the judges in Trevett had sustained Weeden's challenge, the Rhode Island General Assembly summoned the judges to appear
before the Assembly to explain the judges' basis for the holding. 16 The
judges complied with the Assembly's summons but objected to answering
the Assembly's questions.

7

Consequently, the General Assembly sought to

both Houses of Parliament could remove judges from office. Id; see Act of Settlement, 12 &
13 Will. 3, ch.2 (1701). The effect of the Act was to insulate judges from the pressures of the
King and Parliament and to provide impartial administration of law. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 234 (1927). Parliament also enacted legislation granting judges
immunity from all causes of action that arose from any act that a judge performed in his
official capacity. Id.
10. R. POUND, THE SPrT OF rM COMMON LAW 61-62 (1921) (citing Trevett v. Weeden
(Providence 1787)).
11. Id; see Kaufman, supra note 7, at 685-86. The delegates to the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 had convened shortly before the Rhode Island court heard the case of
Trevett v. Weeden. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 685-86; see infra notes 12-19 and accompanying
text (discussing Trevett v. Weeden). During the Convention, James Madison cited Trevett in
support of his argument for measures that would protect the federal judiciary from abuses of
legislative power. Id; see 2 REcoRDs OF TnE FEDEAL CONVENTION OF 1787 28 (M. Farrand
ed. 1911) (discussing Madison's proposal for constitutional provision that would create council
of revision to review constitutionality of legislative acts).
12. R. POUND, supra note 10, at 61-62. The commentary on the decision in Trevett v.
Weeden explains that in 1787, the Rhode Island legislature issued 100,000 pounds of paper
currency and authorized criminal sanctions against any person who refused to accept the bills
in payment for articles offered for sale. Id. Weeden, a butcher, declined to accept the currency
for the purchase of meat. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 685.
13. Id. The statute at issue in Trevett v. Weeden, criminalizing the refusal to accept
Rhode Island paper currency, also denied persons found guilty of violating the statute the
right to appeal the court's decision. Id.
14. Id. at 62.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. When the judges appeared before the Rhode Island General Assembly subsequent
to the decision in Trevett v. Weeden, the judges explained that the state constitution provided
that a person could not receive a prison sentence unless a jury had convicted the person of a
criminal offense. Id. The judges maintained that unless the state legislature amended the
constitution, the Assembly could not compel the judges to send a person to prison unless the
person had received a jury trial. Id.
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remove the judges from the bench, although the judges had not committed
an act that would have warranted removal of the judges from office.18 The
General Assembly finally terminated the removal proceedings only because
removal of judges required a trial on charges of criminal misconduct. 19
As a consequence of the delegates' appreciation of the issues regarding
judicial independence that the Trevett incident raised, the Framers discerned
the need for measures that would insure a strong and independent federal
judiciary, insulated from the influence of the other branches of government.2" To satisfy the need for judicial independence, the Framers created
procedural safeguards that prevented the executive or the legislature from
removing judges capriciously or without good cause. 2' For example, in
article III, section one of the United States Constitution, the Framers
provided that federal judges, unlike state judges, would serve not at the
discretion of an executive or legislative body but would serve for life, unless
the judges had committed one of the offenses that the Framers considered
as warranting removal. 22 Furthermore, the Framers furnished an additional
protection against a capricious legislative removal of a federal judge by
providing in article I of the United States Constitution that the House of

18. Id. Following the Assembly's questioning of the judges concerning the judges' decision
in Trevett v. Weeden, the Assembly voted to remove the judges from office. Id. The state
constitution, however, required that the Assembly remove judges only through impeachment
proceedings. Id.
19. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 685.
20. See 2 J. SToRY, supra note 7, at 385-86 (judiciary must possess power to prevent
legislative or executive branches of government from usurping power of other branches); see
also Tin FEDERMI5T No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (discussing efficacy of government with separate
branches and judiciary's role in maintaining balance of powers among branches of federal
government).
21. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing tenure and impeachment
provisions in United States Constitution regarding federal judges).
22. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. Article III, § 1 of the United States Constitution provides
that federal judges will hold office during good behavior. Id. One commentator noted that
the constitutional provision guaranteeing life tenure for federal judges is similar to the tenure
provision that Parliament had established for the English judiciary in 1701 by the Act of
Settlement. Kaufman, supranote 7, at 686; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining
provision of Act of Settlement establishing life tenure for English judges). Through the tenure
provision in the Act of Settlement, Parliament created an independent judiciary and insulated
the judiciary from the improper influence of the Crown. Kaufman, supra note 7 at 686.
During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, all the various plans that the delegates
had submitted for the establishment of a federal judiciary included the provision that federal
judges were to hold office during good behavior. Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The
Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. Rav. 1104, 1155 (1976). The delegates considered the
provision to be an essential element in preserving judicial independence and in safeguarding
civil and political liberties. See Tit FEDERAisT No. 47 (J. Madison)(explaining purpose and
significance of provision establishing life tenure for federal judges). In addition to the Framers'
provision guaranteeing life tenure for federal judges, the Framers ensured that federal judges
would forfeit the right to lifetime tenure only upon impeachment for treason, bribery or other
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
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Representatives and the Senate must conduct the impeachment process
before removing a federal judge from office. 23
The Framers' establishment of provisions ensuring judicial independence
from the legislative and executive branches of the federal government
represented a marked departure from the position of the judiciary during
the colonial and post-Revolutionary periods in American history.2 4 Unlike
their contemporaries in England, judges in the American colonies did not
receive fixed salaries. 25 Colonial judges instead had to rely upon the assemblies' good favor for judicial compensation. 26 The result of the payment
arrangement was that the assemblies could induce compliance from judges
by reducing judicial salaries. 27
In addition to the assemblies' weakening of judicial independence by
modifying judges' salaries to force judges to remain complacent, the norms
regulating tenure for colonial judges further had diminished the integrity of
colonial judges. 28 By the early 1700's, judges in England had begun to
receive commissions to serve for life. 29 The government in England, however,
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. The United States Constitution reserves the power of
impeachment exclusively to the House of Representatives. Id. Only the Senate, however, may
try impeachments. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, ci. 6.
24. See J. SCHMEDHAUSER, CONsnTuTIoNAL LAW IN AMERiCAN POLITICS 11 (1984). During
the colonial era the Crown selected persons for judicial appointments primarily on the basis
of the candidate's likelihood to support the legality of the Crown's policies in the colonies.
Id. As a consequence, the majority of colonial judges were biased in favor of the Crown and
were either incompetent or corrupt. Id; see infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (explaining
how lack of fixed salaries for colonial judges weakened judicial independence); infra notes 2832 and accompanying text (explaining how absence of provision ensuring life tenure for colonial
judges permitted arbitrary removal of judges and contributed to lack of judicial independence).
After the colonies became independent states, state legislatures dominated state judiciaries and
removed judges arbitrarily. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing ability of
state legislatures to remove judges).
25. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 680-81. During the colonial period, colonial assemblies,
as representatives of the people who contributed the revenues to support government administration, were responsible for appropriating judicial salaries. Black, Massachusetts and the
Judges: Judicial Independence in Perspective, 3 LAw & HIST. REv. 101, 101-02 (1985).
Traditionally, the assemblies made annual salary grants to judges for the services that judges
had performed in the previous year. Id. at 102. Judicial salaries, therefore, were not stable
and fluctuated from year to year. Id.
26. Id.
27. Black, supra note 25, at 102. Because colonial assemblies did not establish fixed
salaries for judges, judges were in jeopardy of losing all or part of their compensation if the
judges had incurred the disfavor of the assembly. Id. In 1726, for example, the New York
Assembly reduced Chief Justice Morris' salary by 17% because Justice Morris' administration
of the court system displeased the Assembly. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 680 n.52.
28. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing tenure policies for colonial
judges, prohibiting issuance of commissions with fixed tenure); see also The Declaration of
Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776). One of the colonists' grievances listed in the Declaration
of Independence was that the Crown had made the tenure of colonial judges completely
dependent upon the King, who could dismiss the judges at his discretion. The Declaration of
Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Act of Settlement provision
establishing life tenure for English judges).
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had forbidden colonial judges from receiving commissions for any fixed
tenure. 0 Because colonial judges held commissions without a fixed tenure,
governors of the colonies could remove and replace the judges with little
difficulty. 3' Consequently, when the colonial judges expressed dissatisfaction
with the Crown's policies in the colonies, colonial governors simply removed
32
the judges.
Despite the American Revolution and subsequent independence from
Great Britain, the judiciaries of the newly formed states lacked a satisfactory
degree of independence from the state legislatures. 33 Most state constitutions
limited the executive's ability to interfere With the operation of the judiciary,
but the state legislatures in most states controlled the process of appointing
and removing state judges.14 The effect of the state legislatures' control over

30. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 680-81. The Home Government in England resisted the
colonial assemblies' demands for judges appointed with a fixed tenure because the Government
feared that governors then would be unable to remove uncooperative or incompetent judges.
Id. at 681. The Home Government also disallowed the provisions of two colonial assemblies,
those of Pennsylvania and of North Carolina, that authorized appointments of judges with
tenure for good behavior. Id; see Smith, supra -note 22, at 1119-25 (discussing Home Government's disallowance of Pennsylvania Assembly's legislation that established for judges tenure
during good behavior.); id. at 1139-42 (discussing Home Government's disallowance of North
Carolina legislation providing life tenure for judges). The Privy Council in England considered
both Pennsylvania and North Carolina acts as tending to increase judicial dependency on
colonial assemblies. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 681. Subsequently, the Privy Council issued
an order to all colonial governors, forbidding the governors to issue appointments with tenure
for good behavior. Id.
31. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 681-82.
32. Smith, supra note 22, at 1104. Although few official documents indicate that colonial
governors replaced judges arbitrarily, colonists' protests published in pamphlets and newsletters
dating to the colonial era indicate that many colonists considered the removals arbitrary. Id.
at 1114 n.60 and accompanying text. One noted account of an arbitrary removal stirred
considerable controversy in New York and England. Id. In 1734, the governor of New York
terminated the commission of Chief Justice Lewis Morris, because the governor objected to
Morris' partisan views. Id. at 1115. Morris went to England and appealed to the Privy Council
for reinstatement of his commission. Id. at 1116. Morris also argued for promulgated standards
regulating removal of colonial judges and for a royal declaration prohibiting governors from
removing colonial judges without the express consent of the Crown. Id. at 1116-17. The Privy
Council denied Morris' appeal for reinstatement of his office. Id. at 1117. The Privy Council
also rejected Morris' requests for established standards regulating removal of judges and for
a royal declaration prohibiting removal of judges without express authorization from the King.
Id.
33. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing predominance of legislature
in state governments formed after American Revolution and legislatures' domination of state
judiciaries).
34. J. Scw~mMHAUSER, supra note 24, at 13. After the American Revolution, the state
legislatures emerged as the dominant political force within state governments, primarily because
the legislatures' colonial counterparts, the assemblies, had been vocal opponents of the Crown's
involvement in the colonies during the colonial period. Id. The legislatures provided rigid
controls over the executive branch because, as former colonists, the legislators had resented
the authority of the colonial governor and intended to preclude the executive from assuming
a similar status within state government. Id.; see Kaufman, supra note 7, at 683 (most state
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the judiciary was that a judge's assertion of judicial privilege often resulted
in the legislatures' dismissal of the judge."
Although the Framers' procedural safeguards protecting the federal
judiciary from the powers of the legislative and executive branches of the
federal government remedied the weaknesses that the Framers perceived in
the colonial and early post-Revolution judiciary, more recent events indicate
that the boundary between proper and improper interaction between the
judiciary and the other branches of government is uncertain. 6 A recent
example of the uncertainty regarding the proper extent and nature of
interaction between the judiciary and the other branches of government is
reflected in The Statement of the Judges.37 In The Statement of the Judges,
a House subcommittee investigating the Department of Justice issued a
subpoena on May 30, 1953, to Judge Louis E. Goodman, a federal district
judge, summoning him to appear at a subcommittee hearing and give
testimony regarding judicial proceedings that had transpired in the Northern
District of California.3 1 Judge Goodman appeared at the hearing and
39
delivered a letter that he and six other judges of the district had prepared.
In the letter the judges defended Judge Goodman's refusal to testify before
the subcommittee by asserting that the subcommittee's questioning of a
member of the federal judiciary would contravene the doctrine of separation
of powers and would amount to an unlawful interference by the legislature
in the functioning of the judiciary. 40 The letter indicated, however, that the

constitutions provided little or no regulation of state legislatures).
The period immediately following the Revolution evinced a strong mistrust for state
judges. J. SCMUDHAUSER, supra note 24, at 13. Although most state constitutions commissioned
judges with tenure during good behavior, state constitutions provided the legislatures and
assemblies with broad discretion to remove state judges. See Smith, supra note 22, at 1153-55
(discussing provisions in various state constitutions permitting removal of state judges).
Consequently, judges who challenged the constitutionality of legislative acts, for example,
often risked dismissal by the state legislature or assembly. R. PoUND, supra note 10, at 62.
35. R. POUND, supra note 10, at 62.
36. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing The Statement of the Judges,
14 F.R.D. 335 (N.D. Cal. 1953)). The most recent incident demonstrating the uncertainty
regarding the propriety of a legislative inquiry into judicial activity occurred during the Senate
confirmation hearings to consider Justice William Rehnquist for the position of Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court. L.A. Daily J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 20, col. 3. Members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee asked Justice Rehnquist to explain the basis for an opinion
that he had written while he was an Associate Justice. Id. In response to the request, Justice
Rehnquist maintained that the Senate Committee could not ask him to account for judicial
acts. Id.
37. 14 F.R.D. 335 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 335-36.
40. Id. In the letter to the House subcommittee investigating the Department of Justice,
the judges of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California stated
that the doctrine of separation of powers precluded the legislature or the executive from
reviewing judicial acts. Id. The letter also noted that only the appropriate appellate tribunals
could review the acts of federal courts. Id. at 336. The judges wrote that if the federal
judiciary permitted the pressure of public opinion to influence its conduct, or permitted the
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judges would not object to Judge Goodman's responding to "proper"
4
questioning on matters other than the judicial proceedings. 1

Although courts seldom have had to delineate the acceptable degree of
legislative or executive inquiry into the affairs of the judiciary, judges have
denoted specific areas of judicial activity that judges traditionally have

considered privileged. 42 The judges who have indicated the significance of
the areas of privileged judicial activity referred to the areas in discussing
the scope of other governmental privileges. 4 In New York Times Co. v.

United States,44 for example, the dissent from the majority of the Supreme

Court noted that the judicial and the executive branches of government
4
possess similar powers to maintain the confidentiality of their functions.
In New York Times Co., the petitioner had attempted to publish documents
that exposed the United States government's involvement in the Viet Nam

War. 46 The United States government asserted a claim of executive privilege
and sought to enjoin publication of the documents. 47 The Supreme Court
upheld the petitioner's first amendment right to publish the documents,
4
despite the government's claim of executive privilege. 1

legislature or the executive to review judicial proceedings, the federal judiciary would compromise its duty to preserve the rights that the Constitution guarantees. Id.
41. Id. In The Statement of the Judges, the judges did not elaborate upon the distinction
between a proper and an improper inquiry into judicial activity. Id.
42. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (indicating that communications among judges and between judges and their clerks are privileged); infra notes 49-51
and accompanying text (implying that documents and deliberations of Supreme Court are not
reviewable by other branches of government); infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text
(indicating that communications between judge and staff regarding merits of pending cases are
privileged).
43. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(purpose of executive privilege
is to safeguard effectiveness of executive decision-making process and is similar to privilege
preserving integrity of judicial deliberations); infra note 51 and accompanying text (president's
privilege for official communications is similar to Supreme Court's authority to protect
confidentiality of Supreme Court documents and deliberations); infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (each branch of government enjoys privilege to preserve confidentiality of decisionmaking process).
44. 403 U.S. 713 (1971)(per curiam).
45. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971)(Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); see infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Burger's
statement that Supreme Court and executive branch have similar authority to protect confidentiality of their respective operations).
46. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714. In United States v. New York Times Co.,
the United States government initiated an action to enjoin the New York Times from publishing
the contents of a classified document, "History of United States Decision Making Process on
Viet Nam Policy." United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 325 (1971).
47. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714. The district court in United States v. New
York Times Co. denied the government's request for a preliminary injunction because the
government had not shown that the publication of the classified documents would threaten
national security. United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F.Supp. 324, 331 (1971). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court decision.
United States v. New York Times, Co. 444 F.2d 544, 544 (2d Cir. 1971)(per curiam).
48. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
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In a footnote to Chief Justice Burger's dissent from the majority decision
in New York Times Co., the Chief Justice made a direct reference to the
existence of a judicial privilege. 49 Burger analogized the executive privilege
that protected the confidentiality of executive documents to the Supreme
Court's power to protect the confidentiality of the Court's deliberations
and internal documents.5 0 Burger explained that although no statutory
provision explicitly conferred upon the Court the power to secure the
confidentiality of its internal documents and deliberations, the Court had
an inherent power to maintain the confidentiality of the Court's operations."
Since Burger's dissent in New York Times Co., other federal judges
have expounded on the notion of governmental privileges and have thus
53
provided further support for judicial privilege.5 2 In Soucie v.David,
for
example, Judge Wilkey, concurring in the opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, explained that the
judicial branch, as well as the other branches of the federal government,
enjoys a privilege against disclosure of the decision-making processes.5 4 In
Soucie, the plaintiffs filed suit to compel the Office of Science and Technology, a federal agency, to release a report that contained an evaluation
of the Supersonic Transport System (SST).15 The district court in Soucie
determined that the agency had prepared the report for the President's use
in making a decision about the SST and that the privilege for intra-government
communications protected the document from disclosure.5 6 The District of
Columbia Circuit in Soucie, however, reversed the district court's decision

49. Id. at 752 n.3.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (discussing privilege
for government officials who formulate legal and political opinions); see infra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text (explaining privilege for deliberative processes of government officials
employed in decision-making capacity).
53. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
54. Id. at 1080. In Soucie v. David, the privilege to which Judge Wilkey referred,
commonly known as the deliberative process privilege, is a qualified privilege that protects the
opinions, evaluations, or recommendations that government officials exchange during policy
deliberation and decision-making. Randle, Deering, Turner & Newman, Executive and Governmental Privileges, in TEsTImoNiAl PRvwEGEs 505-06 (S. Stone & R. Liebman, eds. 1983);
infra 58-66 (discussing rationale of privilege relating to deliberative process).
55. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1068. In Soucie v. David, President Nixon had requested the
Office of Science and Technology (OST), to provide an evaluation of the Supersonic Transport
Aircraft (SST). Id. The President had requested the evaluation for use in formulating an
executive decision. Id.
After the OST had prepared the report and delivered it to the President, the plaintiffs,
two citizens, filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act to compel disclosure of the
document. Id; see Freedom Of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The
Freedom of Information Act requires all federal agencies to make available to the public
adjudicatory opinions, nonpublished policies, and any records that the Act does not exempt
from disclosure. Freedom Of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(l)-(3)(1982 & Supp. III
1985).
56. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1070.
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because the district court had determined incorrectly that the document was
7
privileged.1
In Judge Wilkey's concurrence with the majority in Soucie v. David,
Judge Wilkey indicated that each branch of the federal government enjoys

a privilege protecting its decision-making process. 8 Judge Wilkey explained
that the privilege facilitated the open exchange of ideas among persons

responsible for formulating decisions. 9 Judge Wilkey stated that the federal

government could not operate unless it could employ the doctrine of privilege
to preserve the confidentiality of its communications.6 0 Judge Wilkey reasoned that if federal government officials employed in decision-making
capacities anticipated public disclosure of their confidential communications,
the officials would withhold unpopular proposals for fear that the officials
would endanger their own interests. 61 Judge Wilkey determined that by
withholding possible proposals from consideration, government officials

would jeopardize the integrity of the decision-making process and risk the
implementation of unsound public policies.62 Judge Wilkey noted that,

consequently, a claim of privilege for each branch of government was
process from
necessary to free all persons involved in the decision-making
63
the apprehension of voicing unpopular proposals.
Although Judge Wilkey's discussion of privilege in Soucie did not focus
specifically on judicial privilege, Judge Wilkey's discussion, nevertheless, is

significant in developing the boundaries within which the judicial privilege
should operate.6 Judge Wilkey explained that the purpose of a privilege

for judicial communications was to protect a judge's ability to consider
fully the advice of persons who assist a judge in his decision-making function
and who thus enhance the judge's decision-making capacity.65 Judge Wilkey,

therefore, provided a reasonable basis for concluding that the scope of
judicial privilege should include communications between a judge and his

57. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1073. The court in Soucie v. David determined that the Office
of Science and Technology was a federal agency subject to the disclosure requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act. Id; see supranote 55 and accompanying text (explaining disclosure
requirements of Freedom of Information Act). The court, therefore, determined that the
plaintiffs in Soucie could compel disclosure of the agency report unless a statutory or
constitutional privilege precluded disclosure of the document. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1077.
58. See id. at 1081 (privilege to protect disclosure of government decision-making process
is common to each co-equal branch and finds support in common law and Constitution).
59. Id; see infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text (deliberative process privilege protects
against disclosure of remarks of persons involved in decision-making and thus encourages uninhibited
communication).
60. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1080-81.
61. Id.
62. See id. (unless government communications are privileged, advice that superiors receive
from subordinates may not be as honest as promotion of public good necessitates).
63. Id. at 1081.
64. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (explaining that privilege for judicial
communications should protect process through which judges formulate decisions).
65. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080-81 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(Wilkey, J., concurring).
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law clerks or other staff members with whom the judge discusses the merits
of cases pending in the judge's court. 6
The rationale supporting the legitimacy of privileges for government
communications provided the basis for a recent Eleventh Circuit decision,
Williams v. Mercer,6 7 which explicitly acknowledged the existence of a
qualified privilege that protects the confidentiality of communications between a federal judge and his staff. 6 In Williams, two federal district court
judges of the Eleventh Circuit instituted disciplinary proceedings against
federal district court Judge Alcee L. Hastings under the Judicial Councils
Reform and Disability Act of 1980.69 The two judges alleged that Hastings
had engaged in conduct that was inconsistent with his position as a federal
judge and that had diminished the integrity of the federal judiciary. 70 As

66. Id.
67. 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 106 S. Ct. 3273 (1986).
68. Id. at 1520; see infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (explaining basis of court's
finding of qualified privilege for judicial communications).
69. Williams, 783 F.2d at 1492; see Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States,
593 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (D.D.C. 1984)(discussing events that led to disciplinary proceedings
against Judge Hastings). On March 17, 1983, Chief Judge William Terrell Hodges, of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and Chief Judge Anthony A.
Alaimo, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia,
filed a complaint against Judge Alcee L. Hastings, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Florida, and requested that the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit
discipline Judge Hastings under provisions of the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act (the Act). Id. at 1376 n.1l; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 327(c),
604 (1982 & Supp. 1985). The Act's purpose, in part, is to provide the federal judiciary with
the ability to discipline federal judges who have acted irresponsibly or unethically. See Hastings
v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 593 F. Supp. at 1373 (discussing purpose of Act).
The Act provides that anyone who believes that a federal judge has engaged in unethical
conduct or is unable to discharge the duties of his office because of mental or physical
disability can file a written complaint with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit in
which the judge sits. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (c)(1)(1982). If the chief judge of the court of appeals
accepts the complaint, he must appoint an investigating committee composed of an equal
number of circuit and district court judges of that circfiit to investigate the allegations in the
complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(4)(A)(1982).
Upon receipt of the investigating committee's report, the judicial council shall take
whatever action is appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious administration of the
courts within the circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B)(1982 & Supp. 1985). The council can issue
either a public or private censure, order that the judge not hear any new cases for a certain
period of time, request that the judge retire voluntarily at full salary, or certify the disability
of the judge. Id. The council, however, cannot remove any judge commissioned to hold office
during good behavior. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B)(vii)(I)(1982).
70. Williams, 783 F.2d at 1492. In Williams v. Mercer the allegations in the complaint
that the two judges filed against Judge Hastings in March 1983 stemmed from conduct that
gave rise to Hastings' indictment on criminal charges of bribery in 1981. Id. In the indictment
against Hastings, the grand jury charged that Judge Hastings had conspired to solicit funds
in return for Judge Hastings' performance of an official judicial act. Id. Hastings moved to
quash the indictment on the basis that only Congress could punish an active federal judge for
misdemeanors and that the executive could not prosecute a judge for judicial acts. See Hastings
v. Judicial Conference, 593 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (D.D.C. 1984) (explaining Hastings' motion
to quash indictment). The district court denied the motion. Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
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part of the proceedings against Judge Hastings, an investigating committee
of the Eleventh Circuit issued subpoenas to Judge Hastings' present and
former legal assistants, summoning the legal assistants to appear before the
investigating committee. 7' The purpose of the legal assistants' appearance
was to disclose the substance of confidential legal communications that had
transpired between the judge and the legal assistants. 72 Judge Hastings' staff
claimed a privilege to the substance of the communications and filed suit
in the United States District Court for the District of Florida to enjoin73
enforcement of the subpoenas that the investigating committee had issued.
The United States District Court for the District of Florida dismissed the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Hastings and his staff
appealed from the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
74
Eleventh Circuit.
In response to the contention of Judge Hastings and his staff that

enforcement of the subpoenas would impair the effective functioning of the
judiciary, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a qualified privilege protected
the subject matter of the communications between Judge Hastings and his
staff. 75 The Williams court explained that absent an overriding need for
confidential information which passes between a judge and his clerks,
communications regarding a judge's performance of his official duties
ordinarily should remain undisclosed to protect the integrity of the judicial
decision-making process. 76 The Williams court reasoned that the conversathe district court's decision to deny Judge Hastings' motion to quash. United States v. Hastings,
681 F.2d 706, 707 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983). Judge Hastings was
tried on charges of bribery, but received an acquittal of the charges on February 4, 1983,
because the prosecution had failed to establish Hastings' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Hastings v. Judicial Conference, 593 F. Supp. at 1376 (discussing Judge Hastings' trial and
acquittal of bribery charges).
One month after Judge Hastings' acquittal, Judge Hodges and Judge Alaimo filed a
complaint with the Eleventh Circuit and initiated disciplinary proceedings against Judge
Hastings. Id. at 1376. In the complaint, the judges alleged that Judge Hastings had solicited
funds from lawyers and convicted federal offenders to help defray the cost of Judge Hastings'
criminal defense. Id.
71. Williams, 783 F.2d at 1492-93; see 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(4)(A)(1982). Under the Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, the investigating committee must
conduct as extensive an investigation as it considers necessary and must file a timely report
with the circuit's judicial council, stating the findings of the committee and recommending
action that the council should pursue. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(5)(1982). The investigating committee
has full subpoena powers. Id. § 372(c)(9)(A)(1982).
72. See Williams, 783 F.2d at 1491. In Williams v. Mercer,the four staff members to receive
the subpoenas were Betty Ann Williams, who was Judge Hastings' secretary, and Alan Ehrlich,
Daniel Simons and Jeffrey Miller, former and present law clerks to Judge Hastings. Id. The
investigating committee sought information from the staff members regarding a particular order
that Judge Hastings had entered in October 1981, allegedly the result of a bribe. Id. at 1522.
The committee also had served a subpoena- duces tecum upon Williams, directing her to produce
the original copies of certain diaries and logs from Judge Hastings' chambers. Id. at 1520.
73. Williams v. Mercer, 610 F.Supp 169, 170 (D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied,

__

U.S.

-

, 106 S. Ct. 3273 (1986).

74. Id.
75. Williams, 783 F.2d at 1520.
76. Id. at 1519-20. In Williams v. Mercer, the Eleventh Circuit noted that judges depend

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:213

tions between a federal judge and his staff are part of a judge's core
function.7 7 The Williams court justified its recognition of a privilege for
communications between a judge and his staff by explaining that the
privilege prevented unnecessary intrusion into the substance of judicial
communications that would disrupt a judge's ability to operate effectively. 7s
Although the Eleventh Circuit in Williams concluded that a qualified
privilege exists that protects communications between a federal judge and
his legal assistants, the Eleventh Circuit found that the information regarding
Judge Hastings' alleged judicial misconduct warranted a limited intrusion
into the confidentiality of the communications. 79 The Williams court explained that the investigating committee's grant of authority to aid in
preserving the integrity of the federal judiciary justified an intrusion into
the substance of the communications. s0 Furthermore, the Williams court
noted that the confidential nature of the committee's proceedings mitigated
the severity of the intrusion into Hastings' expectation of confidentiality
and probably would not inhibit the free exchange of ideas between judges
and clerks to the extent that Judge Hastings claimed .8 The Eleventh Circuit,
therefore, upheld the investigating committee's issuance of the subpoenas
and issued an order to compel the staff members to appear at the commit-

tee's proceedings and to disclose the information.82
The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning behind establishing a qualified judicial
privilege protecting the confidentiality of communications between a judge
and his staff members finds support among Supreme Court decisions
clarifying the scope of the legislative and the executive privileges.

3

In Gravel

upon the frank and honest exchanges between themselves and their staff members to discharge
effectively the judge's duties. Id. The Williams court noted that confidentiality of the conversations among judges and between judges and their staff helps to preserve a judge's independent
reasoning from improper external influence. Id.
77. Id. at 1520-21. The Eleventh Circuit in Williams v. Mercer explained that a privilege
for judicial communications extends to communications relating to official judicial activity,
primarily the framing and researching of opinions, orders and rulings. Id. The Williams court
stated that the privilege also extends to conversations between a judge and his staff that
concern matters pending before the court. Id.
78. Id. at 1521.
79. See id., 783 F.2d at 1522. In Williams v. Mercer, the investigating committee sought
information regarding an order that Judge Hastings had entered in October 1981. Id. Judge
Hastings allegedly had entered the order in return for a bribe. Id. Although Judge Hastings'
staff members demonstrated that the investigating committee sought confidential information,
the significance of the investigating committee's function was substantial. Id. at 1523. The
Williams court reasoned that the investigating committee could not conduct an adequate
investigation of the charges against Hastings unless the committee received testimony from
Hastings' staff members regarding the order that Hastings entered. Id.
80. Id. at 1525. In Williams v. Mercer, the Eleventh Circuit weighed Judge Hastings'
interest in preserving the confidentiality of conversations with his assistants against the
investigating committee's need for the assistants' testimony. Id. The court found that the
seriousness of the bribery allegation against Judge Hastings, as well as the investigating
committee's inability to investigate thoroughly the allegation without the assistants' testimony
outweighed Judge Hastings' interest in confidentiality. Id.
81. Id. at 1524-25.
82. Id. at 1525.

83. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text (discussing purpose and scope of
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v. United States,8 4 for example, the Supreme Court expounded upon the
purpose of the privilege applicable to the communications between legislators
and their aides.85 In Gravel, a federal grand jury investigating possible
criminal conduct regarding the release and publication of the Pentagon
Papers issued a subpoena to an aide of United States Senator Mike Gravel,

directing the aide to appear before the grand jury and to explain the aide's
involvement in the publication of the documents. 86 Senator Gravel sought
to quash the subpoena on the ground that the Speech and Debate Clause
of the United States Constitution prohibited the questioning of an aide who
assisted a Senator in performing legislative functions. 87 The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the motion to quash
and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit modified the
decision of the district court.88
In addressing Senator Gravel's challenge to the enforceability of the
subpoena, the Supreme Court in Gravel explained that the purpose of the
legislative privilege embodied in the Speech and Debate Clause is to permit
the legislature to perform its duties free from the threats of or intimidation
by the executive branch. 9 The Gravel Court stated that because of the
legislative privilege); infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text (discussing purpose and scope
of privilege for President's communications with advisors).
84. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
85. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for legislative
privilege).
86. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 608. In Gravel v. United States, the grand jury investigated
allegations that Senator Mike Gravel had arranged for private publication of classified documents regarding United States involvement in the Viet Nam War. Id. at 609. Senator Gravel,
as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works
Committee, allegedly convened a meeting of the subcommittee members and read extensive
portions of the documents to the subcommittee. Id. at 609. After the meeting of the
subcommittee, Senator Gravel deposited the classified documents in the public record. Id.
Leonard Rodberg, the aide whom the grand jury subpoenaed to testify, had assisted Senator
Gravel in planning and conducting the Subcommittee meeting. Id. A few weeks after the
meeting at which Senator Gravel read the documents, the press reported that Senator Gravel
and his staff had arranged for the press to publish the classified documents. Id. at 609-10.
87. Id. at 608-09. In United States v. Doe, Senator Gravel's aide, Leonard Rodberg,
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to quash the
subpoena ordering him to testify at the grand jury proceeding. United States v. Doe, 332 F.
Supp 930, 930 (D. Mass. 1971), modified 455 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1972). The district court
permitted Senator Gravel to intervene in Rodberg's motion to quash. Id.; see also U.S. CONsT.
art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (Speech and Debate Clause of United States Constitution provides members
of Congress with immunity from questioning concerning legislative acts).
88. United States v. Doe, 332 F.Supp. 930, 936 (D. Mass. 1971), modified 455 F.2d 753
(Ist Cir. 1972). The district court in Doe v. United States denied Senator Gravel's motion to
quash the subpoena issued to his aide because the court determined that arranging for private
publication of the classified documents was not a legislative act and, therefore, not privileged.
Id. at 936.
89. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616. The Supreme Court in Gravel v. United States explained
that the last sentence of the Speech and Debate Clause provides two privileges for members
of Congress. Id. at 614. The Clause prohibits the arrest of a congressman for a civil offense
while the congressman travels to or from the Congress while the House to which he belongs
is in session. Id. The Clause also prohibits the questioning of a congressman about legislative
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legislative privilege, the executive branch could not question a member of
Congress about any act that is an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative process through which members of Congress formulate and
enact legislation. 9° The Court noted, moreover, that the executive branch
could not interfere with the legislative process by requesting congressional
aides to account for the aides' acts performed in assisting members of
Congress, because congressional aides often perform acts vital to the functioning of the legislative process. 9' Although the Court in Gravel stated that
the legislative privilege extended to congressmen and their aides, the Court

indicated that the legislative privilege did not protect areas of legislative
activity that were not crucial to the deliberative and communicative processes
of formulating and enacting legislation. 92 Consequently, the Court in Gravel
found that the grand jury properly could question Senator Gravel's aide
about any activity performed on Senator Gravel's behalf that did not impugn
a genuine legislative act. 93

The Williams decision, acknowledging a qualified privilege for communications between a judge and his staff, also finds support in the Supreme
Court's decision in Nixon v. United States,94 in which the Court held that
a qualified privilege existed for communications between the President and
his aides.95 In Nixon, a federal grand jury issued a third party subpoena
duces tecum directing President Richard Nixon to produce certain tape
recordings of conversations with presidential aides who were under indictfunctions in any place other than the House to which he belongs. Id. at 615; see Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881) (Speech and Debate Clause protects members of Congress
in performance of acts usually done in either House during sessions). The Speech and Debate
Clause, however, does not shield a congressman from arrest for criminal offenses. Gravel, 408
U.S. at 614.
90. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616. The Supreme Court in Gravel v. United States explained
that the Speech and Debate Clause in Article I, § 6, cl. 1. of the United States Constitution protects
members of Congress from interference by the executive branch directly upon the legislative
process. Id.; see United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966)(purpose of Speech and
Debate Clause is to prevent executive branch from intimidating legislators).
91. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616-17. In Gravel v. United States, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that members of Congress are dependent upon their aides' assistance in performing legislative duties. Id. at 616. The significance of the aides' contribution to the effective
functioning of the legislative branch warrants protection for aides from executive interference
similar to the protection congressmen receive. Id. at 616-17.
92. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625. In Gravel v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that
the primary areas of legislative activity that the Speech and Debate Clause protects are speeches
and debates in the Houses of Congress. Id. The Gravel Court explained that protection extends
to areas beyond speech and debate only if the activity forms an integral part of the proceedings
by which the members of Congress engage in the deliberation over and passage or rejection
of proposed legislation. Id.
93. Id. at 628. The Supreme Court in Gravel v. United States indicated that Senator
Gravel's arrangement for the publication of the classified documents was not a legislative act.
Id. Because the aide had not assisted Senator Gravel in performing a legislative act, the aide
did not enjoy protection under the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I, § 6, cl.1. of the United
States Constitution. Id.
94. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
95. Id. at 708.
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ment for charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice. 96 The President moved
to quash the subpoena duces tecum. 97 The President claimed that the

executive privilege protected all communications between the President and
his aides, including the tapes that the district court had ordered the President
to produce. 9
Despite the President's claim that an absolute privilege existed for all
communications with his aides, the Supreme Court in Nixon rejected a
finding of an absolute privilege for all presidential communications. 9 The
Nixon Court recognized that indiscriminate intrusion into, and the resulting
public disclosure of, the substance of the President's conversations with his
advisors would impair the President's ability to solicit candid and honest
assessments from his aides.'00 The Nixon Court found, however, that an
absolute privilege would conflict with the intent of the Framers to form a
balanced government and would burden unduly the administration of justice. 10' The Nixon Court thus determined that absent the need to protect
96. Id. at 686. In Nixon v. United States, a federal grand jury investigating possible
criminal activity regarding the Watergate conspiracy returned indictments against seven aides
of President Richard Nixon, charging the aides with conspiracy to defraud the United States
and to obstruct justice. Id at 687. Each of the seven aides whom the grand jury named in the
indictment had held a position either as a White House staff member or as a member of the
Committee for the Re-election of the President. Id. at 687 n.3.
After the grand jury returned the indictments against the aides, the Watergate Special
Prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, moved for a third-party subpoena duces tecum to compel the
President to produce, for use at the criminal trial of the indicted defendants, sixty-four
documents and tape recordings of the President's conversations with the aides about Watergate.
Id. at 688. United States District Judge John Sirica granted the Special Prosecutor's motion.
The Special Prosecutor's motion for the subpoena duces tecum included sworn statements
from one or more of the participants in the taped conversations that the conversations would
reveal information regarding the aides' involvement in the Watergate conspiracy. Id. at 700.
97. Id. at 688.
98. Id. at 705. In Nixon v. United States, President Nixon proposed two arguments to
support his motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. Id. President Nixon claimed that the
common law privilege for intragovernment communications protected President Nixon's conversations with persons who assisted him in performing his executive duties. Id; see supra note
54 and accompanying text (explaining scope of privilege for deliberative processes of government
officials); supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text (explaining rationale for deliberative process
privilege). The President also claimed that the doctrine of separation of powers precluded the
judiciary from intruding into confidential conversations of the executive branch. Nixon, 418
U.S. at 706. The President asserted that the inquiry would interrupt performance of his
constitutional duties and would threaten the independence of the executive branch. Id.
99. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707; see infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (explaining
Supreme Court's holding that President had qualified privilege for communications between
him and his aides).
100. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708. The Supreme Court in Nixon v. United States indicated
that the President's privilege in his communications rests on both the need to encourage candor
in the advice that aides give to the President in formulating policies and the need to preserve
the constitutional independence of the executive branch. Id. at 708. The Nixon Court also
indicated that the doctrine of separation of powers supports both the general executive privilege
for communications between government officials and the privilege for conversations between
the President and those who assist him in performing the duties that the Constituti6n enumerates
under Article II. Id.
101. Id. Although the Supreme Court in Nixon v. United States indicated that the
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diplomatic or military secrets the President's "generalized interest" in the
confidentiality of his discussions warranted only a qualified privilege that
could be overcome upon a showing of substantial need for the information
as evidence in a pending criminal trial. 0 2
Although Gravel and Nixon support the Williams court's recognition
of a qualified judicial privilege protecting the decision-making process of
the judiciary, some commentators have advocated greater disclosure of the
judicial decision-making process. 03 One commentator has noted that judicial
decisions often have significant social consequences that affect substantive
legal rights.104 Within the last twenty years, for example, courts have had
to resolve controversial and politically charged issues regarding capital
punishment, abortion, and school desegregation. 05 Because of the significant
political effects of judicial decisions, commentators object to the circumstance that published opinions represent the full extent to which judges
must reveal the influences that shape their decisions.1 0 Opponents of judicial
confidentiality, arguing that the secrecy surrounding the judicial decisionmaking process is undemocratic, demand that judges provide the public
with greater access to the process through which judges formulate judicial
decisions. 0 7
President's power is supreme within the areas that the Constitution specifies, the Court stated
that the President's right to assert a privilege was secondary to preserving the Framers' intent
to provide the framework for a workable government. Id. at 707; see Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)(Jackson, J., concurring)(although Constitution
allocates power among branches of government to preserve liberty, Constitution provides for
integrated and workable government). The Court in Nixon further indicated that the recognition
of an absolute privilege for Presidential communications would conflict with the primary
constitutional duty of the judicial branch to ensure fair adjudication of criminal prosecutions
and would burden unduly the administration of justice. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707-08.
102. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706. In Nixon v. United States, the Supreme Court determined
that the President's interest in preserving the confidentiality of his communications with his
aides warranted a qualified privilege. Id. The Nixon Court noted, however, that the privilege
against disclosure of military or diplomatic secrets is absolute. Id.
103. See Miller & Sastri, supra note 3, at 802-06 (published opinions of Supreme Court
rarely provide full and satisfactory explanation of reasoning for judicial decisions, and Supreme
Court Justices, therefore, should provide more complete accounts of deliberations); Grossman,
supra note 3, at 831 (greater access to judicial decision-making process would increase public
confidence in judiciary).
104. Abramson, Should a Clerk Ever Reveal Confidential Information?, 63
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361, 402 (1980).
105. Id. In addressing the issue regarding secrecy of the judicial decision-making process,
one commentator has noted that appellate courts increasingly have had to resolve controversial
issues that the executive and legislative branches have avoided because the issues were too
politically sensitive. Id.
106. Miller & Sastri, supra note 3, at 800.
107. Id. at 822. Opponents of the confidential nature of the judicial decision-making
process contend that, ideally, any government entity that espouses democratic principles should
explain the basis for policies and decisions that affect citizens. Id. Only pressing interests in
national security justify the withholding of information from the public. Id. Increased public
access to the judicial decision-making process would increase the public's confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary and would encourage judges to make careful and informed decisions.
Id.
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Maintaining the confidentiality of judicial communications is not necessarily inconsistent with the ideals of a democratic society, but rather
facilitates a fair and impartial adjudication of complex issues. 108 In Chandler
v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit,0 9 the Supreme Court asserted that
a judge must observe impartiality at every stage of the decision-making
process." 0 In Chandler, Judge Stephen S. Chandler, United States District
Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma, challenged an order of the
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit that temporarily prevented Judge
Chandler from hearing new cases. "I Judge Chandler argued that the
Council's order was an impermissible infringement of his constitutionally
guaranteed independence. 12 Although the Supreme Court in Chandlerdenied
Judge Chandler's request for a writ of mandamus directed to the Council
to stay the order, the Chandler Court indicated that an order which
interfered with a judge's ability to make an impartial and independent
decision regarding cases would be unconstitutional." 3

In indicating that a judge must observe impartiality during the decisionmaking process, the Chandler Court suggested that the purpose of observing

impartiality is to permit a judge to render decisions based on equitable
principals and not the dictates of a majority." 4 Maintaining the confiden108. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (explaining that confidentiality of
judicial communications preserves judicial impattiality); infra notes 124-32 and accompanying
text (explaining that preserving confidentiality of communications between judges and assistants
aids judges in formulating sound decisions).
109. 398 U.S. 74 (1969).
110. Id. at 84.
Ill. Id. at 75. In 1939, Congress passed legislation providing for the formation of a
judicial council for each judicial circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1982 & Supp. 1985). Each judicial
council, composed of the circuit judges for the particular circuit, must meet twice each year
to attend to matters that affect the administration of the courts in the circuit. Id. The district
judges of the circuit in which a judicial council presides must comply with the orders of the
council. Id.
In Chandlerv. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, the Judicial Council for the Tenth
Circuit, concerned that Judge Chandler had been a party defendant in both civil and criminal
litigation for four years, issued an order pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §332 of the United States
Code, prohibiting Judge Chandler from hearing new cases or pending cases until the Judicial
Council superceded the order. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 77-78. The Council later amended the
order to permit Judge Chandler to dispose of cases that he had begun to hear before the
Judicial Council issued the order. Id. at 80. Upon receipt of the order, Judge Chandler filed
a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or mandamus directed to the
Council, as well as a stay of the Council's order. Id. at 79.
112. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 82. In Chandler v. Judicial Council, Judge Chandler asserted
that any order of the Judicial Council that regulated Judge Chandler's ability to hear cases
was an unconstitutional infringement of judicial independence and was a usurpation of the
impeachment powers of Article I, § 3 of the United States Constitution. Id.
113. Id. at 87-88. The Supreme Court in Chandler v. Judicial Council denied Judge
Chandler's request for relief because Judge Chandler had not sought relief from the Judicial
Council or another tribunal, even when the Council had presented an opportunity for Judge
Chandler to appeal to the Council for a modification of the Council's order. Id. at 87.
114. Id. at 84. Although the Supreme Court in Chandler v. Judicial Council did not
decide whether the Judicial Council had exceeded its authority to regulate the administration
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tiality of the judicial decision-making process fosters a judge's ability to
make impartial decisions because confidentiality insulates judges from the
pressure of public opinion and the temptation to make decisions consistent
with shifts in public opinion.11 5 Without a privilege protecting the substance
of judicial communications, judges, anticipating public dissemination of the
substance of judicial communications, would refrain from speaking frankly
during deliberations or conversations with staff members for fear that the
public would deride judges' positions that are unpopular.11 6 Furthermore, a

judge may refuse to change an opinion during subsequent
deliberations once
7
the judge's position becomes known to the public.1
Although opponents of judicial confidentiality argue that the need to

preserve the confidentiality of the judicial system and to shield a judge
from the pressures of public sentiment is groundless, commentators who
favor closer public scrutiny of judges underestimate the potentially debili-

tating effect that public opinion could have on a judge's ability to remain
impartial."' The guarantee of life tenure, for example, did not insulate
United States District Court Judge Waties Waring from the coercive influence of racial segregationalists who opposed Judge Waring's views on
segregation. 19 In 1951, Judge Waring, as a member of a three judge panel

that entertained a challenge to South Carolina's segregation laws, dissented
from the court's ruling that South Carolina's segregation laws were constitutional. 20 After the ruling, Judge Waring became the victim of intense

of the courts by prohibiting Judge Chandler from hearing new cases, the Court indicated that
preserving the independence of federal judges was imperative to the effective functioning of
the judicial branch. Id; see Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979) (society has strong
interest in providing judges with ability to deal impartially with public).
115. See Howard, Comment on "Secrecy and the Supreme Court," 22 BUri'Ao L. Rv.
837, 839-40 (1973) (secrecy of Supreme Court deliberations prevents leaks, fosters frank
discussion, and helps preserve judicial independence); infra notes 124-32 and accompanying
text (preserving confidentiality of communications between judges and their clerks encourages
judges to discuss legal issues thoroughly and promotes integrity of judicial decision-making
process).
116. Howard, supra note 115 at 839-40; see Tribe, Trying California's Judges on Television: Open Government or Judicial Intimidation?, 65 A.B.A.J. 1175, 1178 (1979) (without
confidentiality, judges will avoid candid deliberation and exchange of unpopular ideas without
which judicial decision-making process is ineffective).
117. See Howard, supra note 115, at 839-40. Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren noted
that the Supreme Court managed to arrive at a unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of
Education only because the Justices did not have to commit themselves to a decision until the
Justices had deliberated informally for weeks before expressing their opinions to each other.
Id.; see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). One commentator has speculated
that the Justices in Brown would have remained intransigent if they had had to cast their
initial votes before deliberations. Howard, supra, at 839-40.
118. Tribe, supra note 116, at 1178 (judges could not provide impartial administration of
law if judges' thought processes and deliberations were subject to public scrutiny).
119. See J. PELTASON, Fury-Eomir LONELY MEN, 10 (1961) (discussing opposition against
federal judges who issued or enforced orders to desegregate Southern schools during 1950's).
120. Id.
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local abuse and received threats on his life. 12' As a consequence of the
severe public reaction to Judge Waring's opinion, Judge Waring resigned
his judicial commission shortly thereafter. 122 Because the prospect of an
unfavorable public reaction to a judge's decision could influence a judge's
ability to adjudicate impartially, the preservation of the confidentiality of
the judicial decision-making process is justifiable. Confidentiality minimizes
the possibility that judges will succumb to public pressure and abdicate
judicial impartiality in favor of conformity to public opinion.
In addition to preserving the impartial interpretation of the law, confidentiality of judicial communications arguably increases the likelihood that
a judge's decision is sound and carefully considered. 23 A judge and his law
clerk usually develop a intimate working relationship that enhances a judge's
decision-making process. 24 The interchange of ideas between a judge and
his clerk helps a judge to clarify his understanding of the legal issues in a
particular case. 125 Moreover, the interchange allows a judge to reveal to his

clerk without apprehension both his perceptions regarding the merits of
pending cases and the judge's uncertainties about .the possible consequences
of his decisions. 2 6 Judges rely on their clerks' ideas and insights in for-

mulating decisions and expect clerks to maintain the confidentiality of
communications regarding judicial decisions. 27
The benefits that enure to the judicial decision-making process through

the interchange of ideas between a judge and his clerk would dissipate
unless the communications between a judge and his clerk remained confi-

121. Id. After Judge Waties Waring had delivered his dissenting opinion that South
Carolina's segregation laws were unconstitutional, Judge Waring's reputation was slandered
and he and his family received threats of physical abuse. Id. Many judges who issued school
desegregation orders in the South during the 1950's and 1960's often received threats from
persons opposed to desegregation. Id. As a result, many judges sought police protection for
themselves and their families. Id.
122. Id.
123. See infra notes 124-131 and accompanying notes (explaining that confidentiality of
communications between judge and his assistants fosters uninhibited exchange of ideas and
strengthens integrity of judicial decision-making process).
124. See Note, The Law Clerk's Duty of Confidentiality, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1230, 1242
(1981) (judge-clerk relationship is multifaceted and is analogous to teacher-pupil, employeremployee, and lawyer-lawyer relationships).
125. Id.

126. Id.at 1240.
127. Id. In November 1980 a student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School

conducted a survey of 375 state and federal judges about the significance of the judge-clerk
relationship and the importance of preserving the confidentiality of judge-clerk communications.
Id. Approximately one-third of the judges who received the survey responded. Id. Although
the response rate was not sufficient to warrant a statistical finding, 100% of the judges who
responded to the survey indicated that a clerk had a duty to avoid disclosing information
about pending cases that was not available from the public records. Id. Eighty percent of the
judges indicated that a clerk's knowledge of specific wrong-doing involving the court justified
the clerk's breach of his confidential relationship with a judge to reveal the impropriety. Id.
Fifty-nine percent of the judges responded that a clerk should respond to a subpoena directing
the clerk to reveal confidential information regarding judicial misconduct. Id.
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dential1 2 One commentator has suggested that a judge conceivably would
be more hesitant to expose his uncertainties and his personal prejudices to
his clerk if the judge anticipated that his clerk might expose to persons
outside the judge's chambers the substance of the judge's communications. 129
A judge, consequently, would retreat into greater isolation and would not
engage his clerk in the decision-making process. 13 0 By withdrawing from the
dialectic with his clerks and persons who assist a judge in formulating his
thoughts, the judge would forgo the opportunity to clarify and to distill his
reasoning for a judicial decision and therefore would forfeit the opportunity
to strengthen the integrity of the judicial decision-making process. 3'
A privilege for judicial communications preserves judicial independence
and protects the integrity of the judicial decision-making process. 3 2 The
privilege insulates the judiciary from an improper intrusion into the function
of the judicial branch. 33 Moreover, the privilege encourages the uninhibited
exchange of ideas among persons who assist a judge in formulating decisions
34
and thus enhances the judge's ability to make sound and prudent decisions.
Finally, the privilege shields judges from public scrutiny or the pressure of
public opinion that would impair a judge's ability to render impartial
decisions.' 35
The privilege for judicial communications, however, is not absolute and
must yield if significant interests outweigh a judge's interest in confidentiality.'36 For example, the demonstrated need for evidence in a criminal
prosecution or in an investigation of judicial misconduct warrants an intrusion into confidential judicial communications. 3 7 In considering whether to
compel disclosure of judicial communications, courts should realize, however, that indiscriminate or unnecessary intrusions into the confidentiality

128. See id. at 1263. In the survey of judges that a University of Pennsylvania law student
conducted, over half of the respondents indicated that a clerk's breach of confidence would
have a negative impact on the judges' relationship with their clerks. Id. at 1237. Many of the
judges indicated that subsequent to learning about the breach of confidence, judges would
limit severely the range and type of discussions that the judges would have with their clerks.
Id.

129. Id. at 1238.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Williams v. Mercer, 783 F.2d 1488, 1520 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,-

U.S.

-,

106 S. Ct. 3273 (1986).
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text (explaining that privilege for communications between judge and clerk encourages judges and clerks to discuss legal issues
candidly and thus fosters sound decision-making).
135. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (explaining how privilege for substance
of judicial communications protects judges from pressure of public opinion that would inhibit
judges' ability to render impartial decisions).
136. See supra notes 75-80 (discussing rationale for holding that privilege for judicial
communications is qualified and can be overcome).
137. Williams v. Mercer, 783 F.2d 1488, 1522 (1lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, __

106 S. Ct. 3273 (1986).

U.S.

__

,
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of judicial communications may infringe upon a judge's independence and
would inhibit the exchange of ideas between judges and persons who assist
38
them in their official duties.
K~vn C. MilNE

138. Id.

